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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Procedure-Waiver of Indictment Precluded When
Offense Charged Under Lindberg Act
In Smith v. United States' the petitioner and his companions had
escaped from a Florida jail and had seized an automobile, forcing its
owner to accompany them to Alabama where he was released unharmed.
Petitioner waived indictment and was charged by information that he
did "knowingly transport in interstate commerce ... a person . . . who
had been unlawfully seized, kidnapped, abucted and carried away .... ,-
2
The information did not allege whether the victim had been released
harmed or unharmed. The accused was convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment pursuant to the Lindberg Act.3 This act provides that
punishment shall be: (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been
liberated unharmed and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or
(2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death
penalty is not imposed. On appeal the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 4 After granting certiorari the United States Supreme Court
ruled that indictment could not be waived, and the case was reversed
and remanded with instructions to dismiss the information., In a six-
to-three decision the Court held that indictment was required because
the statutory offense is sufficiently broad to justify a capital verdict
and hence the trial must proceed on this basis, even though the evi-
dence later establishes that such a verdict cannot be sustained because
the victim was liberated unharmed. The majority stated that although
the imposition of the death penalty will depend upon the proof intro-
duced at trial, that circumstance does not alter the fact that the offense
is one which may be punished by death.
In all capital offenses indictment is mandatory under the fifth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides
that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital . .. crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury .... ." This policy has
been incorporated into Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(a) which
states: "An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted
by indictment." (Emphasis added.) In the principal case the majority
based their decision on the premise that kidnapping under the statute
is a capital offense whether or not there is an allegation that "the kid-
napped person has not been liberated unharmed."(;
Prior to the principal case the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had
held that kidnapping was not a capital offense when the indictment
failed to allege that the victim was not liberated unharmed. 7 However,
1-360 U.S. 1 (1959). 2 Id. at 7. ' 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1950).
1 Smith v. United States, 250 F2d 842 (5th Cir. 1957). On an earlier appeal
conviction had been set aside on the ground that the trial court had denied de-
fendant due process. Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1956).
6360 U.S. 1 (1959). 0360 U.S. at 8.
"United States v. Parker, 103 F.2d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 1939).
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the decisions of the Second Circuit were in conflict with this view, and
the Supreme Court in the principal case cited with apparent approval
the dictum in United States v. Parrino,s to the effect that the allegation
that the victim was not released unharmed goes only to the punishment
and is not part of the offense and that a defendant has no right to be
informed beforehand of the punishment the Government seeks. When
viewed in the light of this dictum the present position of the court
appears to be that an allegation in the indictment that the victim was
"not released unharmed" is not necessary to allow either the introduc-
tion of evidence of harm or the jury's recommendation of the death
penalty. Such a rule would seem to place the defendant in danger of
being prejudicially surprised at the trial.9 The Court in the principal
case states that the defendant's procedural safeguards against such sur-
prise are discovery and a bill of particulars.10
This ruling may present serious problems to the defendant in the
conduct of his defense. If evidence of harm were admitted under an
indictment which did not allege harm, then it would appear that the
heretofore well-defined requirements of definiteness, exactitude and
certainty in an indictment1 ' are not satisfied. In a similar situation,
for example, it has been held that where the degree of larceny, and
consequently the severity of punishment, depends upon the value of the
property stolen, then the value of such property must be alleged and
proved.12  Certainly there is doubt that such an indictment as would
be permitted by the principal decision provides the defendant with suf-
ficient information to enable him to prepare his defense.' 3 He will not
be able to ascertain from it whether the prosecution will seek to estab-
lish the fact that he did not liberate the victim unharmed, and thus he
will not know the full extent of his jeopardy until the trial. Certainly
the attorney who must conduct the defense is in danger of being sur-
prised. Even if defendant is aware that he has harmed the victim it
is often difficult to persuade a criminal defendant to be frank with his
counsel.
Where can a defendant finding himself in such a position look for
protection from surprise? The court has said that this protection will
be discovery,14 but it is doubtful that discovery will provide the de-
fendant with the information he seeks. It is clear from the legislative
8180 F.2d 613, 615 (?d Cir. 1950).
360 U.S. at 12 (separate opinion).
20 Id. at 10.
" "If the indictment leaves the defendant in fair doubt as to the offense charged,
it fails to meet the test that an indictment. should 'leave no doubt in the minds of
the accused and the court of the exact offense intended to be charged'." Bratton
v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934).
"2 Cartwright v. United States, 146 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1944).
" 360 U.S. at 16-17 (separate opinion).
"I Id. at 10.
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history'8 of the Federal Rules that the grand jury minutes cannot be
reached by a defendant under Rule 16.16 Rule 16 is of no help in reach-
ing the statements of government witnesses, except in the comparatively
rare case where such statements have been seized or obtained by process.
The rule itself provides that the motion for discovery may be made "at
any time after the filing of the indictment or information"; thus the
defendant has no right to discovery prior to indictment. The use of
this rule is made even less effective if discovery is denied by the trial
court because there can be no interlocutory appeal from such denial.",
The other provision for discovery is Federal Rule 17(c) which pro-
vides for discovery before trial through subpoena. The written state-
ments of witnesses are considered as "papers and documents"' 8 within
the language of this rule and thus are seemingly available to the defend-
ant. However, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is the
only court which has permitted defendants to reach the statements of
witnesses under this rule.19 The majority of courts20 have denied
defendants this opportunity because such statements are not evidentiary
until the witness has testified in court, and there is always the possibility
that the witness will not be called at the trial.
A more liberal construction of Federal Rules 16 and 17(c) would
be prevented by a recent statute,21 the language of which specifies:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States which
was made by a Government witness or prospective Government
witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the Govern-
ment shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection
until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial
of the case. (Emphasis added.)
This statute make no distinction between capital and noncapital
offenses. Therefore, if defendant must rely on discovery or inspection
for his protection he will not know that he may be on trial for his life
15 Oriield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA.
L. REv. 221 (1957).
" Fn. R. Cvan. P. 16: "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the
filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the
Government to permit defendant to inspect . . . books, papers . . . obtained from
or belonging to defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process ...
17 Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221 (1929).
18 Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134, 136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
"'Ibid. Contra, United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954) (a
non-capital case).2 United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1955); United States
v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. Brown, 17
F.R.D. 286, 287-88 (N.D. Ill. 1955); United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431,
437 (N.D. Cal. 1954). The foregoing cases were all concerned with non-capital
offenses. However, the same rationale would apply in either case; there is no
more advance certainty that a given witness will be called in a capital case than
in a non-capital case.218 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
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until the Government witness has testified that the victim was "not
liberated unharmed." In a case22 decided recently by the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals the statute was construed to prohibit a defendant
from reaching the statements of witnesses until those witnesses had
testified. Fourteen days after the principal case was decided this con-
struction was affirmed by a divided United States Supreme Court.
23
The opportunity of inspection during the trial would be of little value
to the defendant. Cross-examination, impeachment and rebuttal depend
on careful investigation and preparation, and continuances during the
trial are usually too short to allow this.2 4  Kidnapping cases may pre-
sent complex issues that require extensive investigation and research
before trial, and the defendant who is not aware of all the problems he
will face until after the testimony of prosecution witnesses will be
seriously prejudiced.
The last safeguard recommended by the court in the principal case
was the use of a bill of particulars.25 There is no doubt that a bill may
be obtained in this situation.26  However, since a bill of particulars is
required only to set out with certainty the offense charged,2 7 it will not
aid the defendant here, because under the Court's view of the nature and
elements of kidnapping the specific information the defendant seeks is
not an element of the offense. United States v. Parrino,28 cited in the
principal case, stated that the matter of harm goes only to the punish-
ment and does not affect the nature of the crime. Therefore, it does
not appear that the Government would be required, in a bill of particu-
lars or otherwise, to make known the punishment it intends to seek or
the requirements for such punishment that it intends to prove. Although
it is true that the evidence must conform to the bill,2 9 it would be in-
consistent to say that evidence of harm not alleged in the bill is inadmis-
sible for this reason, since the courts have held that such evidence may
be introduced when harm is not alleged in the indictment.
The holding in the principal case presents a problem to the defendant
when the prosecution has no intention of alleging or proving that the
victim was harmed, as would appear to be the situation in the principal
case. By the majority opinion, this defendant would be subject to the
" United States v. Lev, 258 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1958).
" Lev v. United States, 360 U.S. 470 (1959).
2, ORFrELD, CRimiNAL PRocEDuE FRo AJPMT TO APPEAL 330 (1947).25 360 U.S. at 10.
2" "A bill should only be required where the charges of an indictment are so
general that they do not advise defendant of the specific acts of which he is
accused." United States v. Rosenwasser Bros., 255 Fed. 233, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1919).
" The fundamental purpose of a bill of particulars is to apprise the defendant
or the crinze charged with sufficient particularity to enable him to properly pre-
pare a defense to such charge . . . ." United States v. Macleod Bureau, 6 F.1.D.
590, 592 (D. Mass. 1947). (Emphasis added.)
28 180 F.2d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 1950).
9 Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1945).
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same confinement and delay that would be entailed had the prosecution
sought the death penalty. The purpose of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 7(a), which provides for waiver of indictment in non-capital
cases, was to avoid keeping just such a defendant languishing in jail
getting no credit toward his sentence, while he awaits grand jury
action.30
Also the Government's position in a case where the victim has been
released unharmed has been weakened by the principal decision. It
would seem that the Government must now grant the defendant all the
safeguards to which a defendant in a capital case is entitled even though
a capital penalty is not sought and cannot be obtained. This is contrary
to the congressional intent expressed in the Federal Rules which provide
such safeguards only when a defendant is on trial for his life. These
rules require the Government, in a capital case, to furnish to the de-
fendant a list of veniremen and witnesses to be produced on the trial.
Since this list must be given three days prior to trial, the additional
burden of deciding and making known in advance what witnesses will
be called at the trial is placed on the Government. 31 Defendant will also
be entitled to twenty pre-emptory challenges as against ten granted a
defendant in a non-capital case.3 2
North Carolina law requires a precise and comprehensive indictment
in all cases.3 3 The problem raised in the Smith case does not arise in
North Carolina because our kidnapping statute3 4 does not have the
aggravation provision found in the federal statute. A similar situation
is presented in North Carolina by the burglary statute3 r which provides
for different degrees of burglary and a graduated scale of punishment,
depending upon the degree alleged and proved. If the state seeks the
death penalty it must allege in the indictment that the dwelling was in
the actual occupation of a person at the time of the crime. Without
such averment the indictment is sufficient only for burglary in the
second degree regardless of the proof at trial.3 6
It is submitted that, although the decision in the principal case was
beneficial to the defendant at bar, it has weakened the procedural safe-
guards protecting defendants generally.37 Discovery and bills of par-
ticulars are at this time, and will continue to be, inadequate safeguards
so long as harm, when it exists, is held not to be an element of the
offense of kidnapping under the Lindberg Act. Defendant's ability to
prepare his defense will be greatly impaired if he must wait until the
Government has rested its case before he can know the full degree of
"360 U.S. at 14-15 (separate opinion).18 U.S.C. §3432 (1958). "FED. R. CRIm. P. 24(b).
"State v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 86 S.E.2d 774 (1955) ; State v. Albarty, 238
N.C. 130, 76 S.E.2d 381 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1953). "N.C. Gai'r. STAT. § 14-51 (1953).
" State v. Fleming, 107 N.C. 905, 12 S.E. 131 (1890).
" 360 U.S. at 12 (separate opinion).
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jeopardy to which his actions have exposed him. Perhaps the cause of
justice would have been better served by an adoption of the approach of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to the same case.88 That court held:
(1) since the victim was released unharmed the offense could not be
punishable by death and the defendant could waive indictment, (2) that
prosecution by information will be deemed a waiver of the Govern-
ment's right to ask for the death penalty or for the jury to recommend
it, and (3) that, whether waiver is allowed or whether the prosecution
is to be by indictment, no evidence of harm can be introduced unless
such harm is previously alleged so that the defendant will be made com-
pletely aware of the gravity of the charge he faces.
W. TRAWis PORTER
Eminent Domain-Interest As an Element of Just Compensation
North Carolina recognizes the right of every property owner to
receive just compensation for property taken from him under the power
of eminent domain.' When land is taken under this power, the owner
is entitled to receive an amount equal to the value of the land on the
date of the taking.2 If payment is made later than the date of the taking,
then, when made it must include some additional sum as compensation
for the delay,8 because the condemnee has had neither the legal right to
possession or use of his property nor the use of the money owed him
for the deprivation during this interval.4 Failure to compensate for the
resulting loss would be unconstitutional.5 Interest on the principal sum
from the date of the taking is used as a measuring stick for computing
the condemnee's damages resulting from delay in payment.6 This right
' Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1956).
1 DeBruhl v. Highway Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958); Ivester
v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 88 (1939); Johnston v. Rankin,
70 N.C. 550 (1874); see generally Comment, 35 N.C.L. Rav. 296 (1957).
'Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924); Braswell v.
Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912 (1959) ; Western Carolina Power
Co. v. Hayes, 193 N.C. 104, 136 S.E. 363 (1927).
'United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 82 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1949);
Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 159 N.C. 340, 74 S.E. 890 (1912).
'United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938); United
States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 51 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Wash. 1943); Arkansas-
Missouri Power Co. v. Hamlin, 288 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App. 1956); Balkey v.
Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958).
'United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947) ; Bergen
County Sewer Authority v. Little Ferry, 15 N.J. Super. 43, 83 A.2d 4 (1951);
In re Bronx River Parkway, 284 N.Y. 48, 29 N.E.2d 465 (1940); Annot., 36
A.L.R.2d 337, 428 (1954).
' "The concept of just compensation is comprehensive and includes all elements
.... The owner is not limited to the value of the property at the time of the
taking; 'he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that
value paid contemporaneously with the taking! Interest at a proper rate 'is a good
measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be added.'" Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
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